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Europe’s Biotech Patent Landscape: Conditions and 
Recent Developments 
 




After ten years of discussions and disputes,1 on July 30, 
1998 the European Community’s (“EC”) “Directive 98/44/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on 
the legal protection of biotechnological inventions”2 (“Directive”) 
came into effect.  Until then, ethical considerations had 
protracted the enactment of the Directive as a legal framework 
for biotech patents.  Critics from among the European 
Parliament (“EP”) referred to the “non-patentability of nature,” 
especially with regard to patents on human DNA and gene 
sequences.3  As a result, in 1995 the EP rejected the 
Commission’s4 first draft of the Directive from 1988.5  Fearing 
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 **  All translations by the author. 
 1. See N. R. Scott-Ram & A. G. Sheard, The Rise and Fall of the EU 
Patent Directive, 13 BIO/TECHNOLOGY 734, 734 (1995). 
 2. 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13 [hereinafter Directive].  The first portion of the 
Directive contains a list of recitals.  The recitals are not legally binding, but 
clarify the intent of the drafters and provide guidance in interpreting the 
provisions of the Directive itself. 
 3. See Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the “Proposal 
for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the legal protection of 
biotechnological inventions,” 1996 O.J. (C 295) 11, 12. 
 4. The Commission of the EC is made of twenty “Commissioners.”  The 
Commission nearly always initiates the legislative process in the EC by 
submitting a proposal.  In addition, the Commission has executive powers in 
various fields and has the power to initiate infringement suits against a 
Member State that fails to meet its obligations under EC law. 
236            MINNESOTA INTELL. PROP.  REVIEW [Vol. 3:235    
 
that the United States would consolidate its lead in the 
biotechnological field, the Commission submitted a second draft 
to the EP and the Council6 just a few months later.  The second 
draft then served as the basis for the Directive’s final wording.  
The Directive is expected to guarantee legal uniformity and 
certainty in providing patent protection for biotechnological 
inventions. 
According to Art. 15 paragraph 1 of the Directive, Member 
States shall bring into force the laws, regulations, and 
administrative provisions necessary to comply with the 
Directive no later than July 30, 2000.7  Shortly after the 
Directive’s enactment, several Member States sought its 
annulment.8  After the Advocate General gave his opinion in 
favor of the Directive’s legal validity on June 14, 2001,9 the 
Court of Justice of the European Communities declared the 
Directive legal on October 9, 2001.10  However, many Member 
States have still failed to discharge their obligations.  Only 
Ireland11 and Denmark12 have transformed the Directive into 
national law, while other Member States are attempting to do 
so. 
In view of legal uncertainty in the field of patents on 
biotechnological inventions, the rejection of the Dutch request 
is an important step toward an adequate protection of 
intellectual property in the EC.  However, the Advocate 
 
 5. See Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the “Proposal 
for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the legal protection of 
biotechnological inventions,” 1996 O.J. (C 295) 11, 12. 
 6. The Council is the EC’s institution with the greatest legislative power.  
It consists of representatives of the Member States drawn from the 
governments of those states. 
 7. Directive, supra note 2 art. 5, ¶ 1, at 18. 
 8. See Case C-377/98, Kingdom of the Netherlands v. European 
Parliament and Council of the European Union, Op. Advoc. Gen. ¶ 1 (2001), 
available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/recent/ index_2001.html 
[hereinafter Op. Advoc. Gen.]. 
 9. See id. 
 10. See Case C-377/98, Kingdom of the Netherlands v. European 




 11. See European Communities (Legal Protection of Biotechnological 
Inventions) Regulations, 2000 (Ir.). 
 12. Lov nr. 412 af 31 maj 2000 [Law No. 412 of 31 May 2000]; 
Bekendtgorelse om aendring af bekendtgorelse om patenter og supplerende 
beskyttelsescertifikater. Ref: Bekendtgorelse nr. 1086 af 11/2000 (Den.). 
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General’s final observations concerning the relationship 
between ethical aspects and patent law are insufficient.  
Regardless of the ratio of socio-economic aspects, vague ethical 
considerations have deleterious effects on patent law’s 
neutrality.  In addition, the EC’s efforts to increase the role of 
ethics in biotechnology law13 conflict with WTO law, which aims 
to restrict the influence of socio-economic considerations in 
trade-related decisions. 
 
I. THE APPEAL TO THE COURT OF JUSTICE 
 
At the end of 1998, the Netherlands’ Lower House of 
Parliament rejected a proposal to adopt the Directive into 
Dutch law, arguing that the Directive’s content violates a 
number of fundamental rights.14  Eventually, the Dutch 
government took its complaint to the European Court of Justice 
seeking the Directive’s rescission.15  In particular, it brought an 
action under Art. 173 of the EC Treaty (after amendment, Art. 
230 EC) seeking annulment of the Directive.16  Italy and 
Norway, a non-Member State of the EC, supported the Dutch 
action.17 
The Court of Justice dismissed the Dutch application for 
interim measures on July 25, 2000.18  In his subsequent 
advisory opinion, Advocate General Jacobs also rejected the 
 
 13. See Tade Matthias Spranger, What is Wrong About Human 
Reproductive Cloning? A Legal Perspective, 11 EUBIOS J. OF ASIAN AND INT’L 
BIOETHICS, 101, 101-2 (2001); Tade Matthias Spranger, The Ethics and 
Deliberate Release of GMOs, 11 EUBIOS J. OF ASIAN AND INT’L BIOETHICS, 144, 
144-46 (2001). 
 14. See ALFRED MÜLLER, ET AL., ERNST & YOUNG’S EUROPEAN LIFE 
SCIENCES 99, SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT, COMMUNICATING VALUE 65 (Mike Ward 
ed. 1999); see also Geertrui van Overwalle, Octrooien vor planten onder de EG-
Biotechnologierichtlijn van 6 juli 1998 [Patents for Plants Under the EC 
Biotechnology Directive of 6 July 1998], 7 AGRARISCH RECHT 111, 124 (1999). 
 15. See Op. Advoc. Gen., supra note 8, ¶ 15. 
 16. See id. ¶ 1. 
 17. See id. ¶ 13.  France refused to implement the Directive on ethical 
grounds as well.  See Sabine Louët, French Refuse to Implement Biotech Patent 
Directive, 18 NAT. BIOTECH. 820, 820 (2000).  The United Kingdom is reported 
to believe that no amendment to the UK Patents Act is needed.  See Robin 
Nott, Text of the EC Directive on Biotechnology, with introduction and 
comment, 2 BIO-SCIENCE L. REV. 113, 119 (1998).  The German government’s 
draft of an Act on the implementation of the Directive is a word-for-word 
transmission of the Directive’s provisions and, therefore, similarly fails to put 
the framework of European Law into concrete terms. 
 18. See Op. Advoc. Gen., supra note 8, ¶ 15. 
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material request on June 14, 2001.19  Although the Court is not 
bound by the Advocate General’s opinion, it traditionally serves 
as a guideline for the Court’s deliberations.  Often, the Court 
reaches the Advocate General’s conclusion for the same 
reasons.20  If the Court does not follow the opinion of the 
Advocate General, it presents legal arguments supporting its 
opposing position in much the same way as dissenting judges in 
other judicial systems.21  On October 9, 2001, the Court 
followed the Advocate General’s lead and dismissed the 
action,22 holding that the Directive complies with EC law.  The 
Advocate General’s opinion provides a well-balanced analysis of 
the legal aspects of the case.23 
The Advocate General rejected the grounds for annulment 
cited by the Dutch: 
The grounds invoked for the annulment of the Directive were that 
it (i) is incorrectly based on Art. 100a of the Treaty; 
(ii) is contrary to the principle of susidiarity; 
(iii) infringes the principle of legal certainty; 
(iv) is incompatible with international obligations; 
(v) breaches fundamental rights; and (vi) was not properly adopted 
since the definitive version of the proposal submitted  to the 
Parliament and the Council was not decided on by the college of 
Commissioners.24 
Although all the grounds advanced by the Dutch were 
rejected, the action may not have been fruitless, as it may have 
demonstrated that the concerns submitted by the Dutch 
Government can and should be allayed.  As the Advocate 
General stressed in his opinion, within the Directive’s 
 
 19. See id. 
 20. See GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 72 
(1993). 
 21. See HENRY G. SCHERMERS & DENIS F. WAELBROECK, JUDICIAL 
PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES § 783 (5th ed. 1992). 
 22. See Case C-377/98, Kingdom of the Netherlands v. European 
Parliament and Council of the European Union (2001), available at 
http://www.curia.eu.int/jurisp/cgibin/form.pl?lang=en&Submit=Submit&docre
quire=alldocs&numaff=C377%2F98&datefs=&datefe=&nomusuel=&domaine=
&mots=&resmax=100.  See generally Tade Matthias Spranger, 
Urteilsanmerkung [Case Note on Case C-377/98, Kingdom of the Netherlands 
v. European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Judgment of 9 
October 2001], 50 GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT 
INTERNATIONALER TEIL 1047 (2001). 
 23. See Schermers & Waelbroeck, supra note 21, § 782. 
 24. Op. Advoc. Gen., supra note 8, ¶ 11. 
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framework “there are adequate moral safeguards going, in 
some respects, beyond mere application of the existing criteria 
for patentability.”25  Furthermore, he stated that “the fact that 
the ethical criteria for patentability is not exhaustively 
defined . . . enhances it since future developments will continue 
to be governed by those criteria even if not currently 
foreseeable.”26 
 
II. THE DIRECTIVE’S MAIN OBJECTIVES 
 
Following longstanding unemployment in Europe, the 
European Community (“EC”) realized the importance of 
protecting biotechnology intellectual property rights for its 
economic development, due to biotechnology’s potential for 
creating jobs.  Understanding that national differences in the 
legal protection of biotechnological inventions could “create 
barriers to trade and hence impede the proper functioning of 
the internal market,”27 the EC created a legal framework on its 
own.  Within this framework, the rules of national patent law 
remain the essential basis for the legal protection of 
biotechnological inventions.  The EC’s legal standards are 
limited to establishing certain principles for applying national 
laws to the patentability of biological material as such. 
 
A. PATENTS ON HUMAN DNA AND GENE SEQUENCES 
 
The most important part of the Directive ensures the 
patentability of human DNA or gene sequences, which is also 
guaranteed by World Trade Organization (“WTO”) law.  For 
example, Art. 27 paragraph 1 of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) 
demands that “patents shall be available for any inventions, 
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, 
provided that they meet the general requirements of novelty, 
inventive step, and capability of industrial application.”28  
 
 25. Id. ¶ 227. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Directive, supra note 2, recital 5, at 13. 
 28. Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Apr. 15, 1994, art. 27, ¶ 1, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, 319, 331 [hereinafter TRIPS].  See generally Hans-Jürgen 
Schulze-Steinen, Patents, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE 47, 48 (International Chamber of Commerce 1996). 
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Before the Directive’s promulgation, the EC and some of its 
Member States neglected their obligation to enforce this 
standard.29  The European Patent Convention of 1973, an 
intergovernmental instrument that led to the establishment of 
the European Patent Office (“EPO”), had been unable to fill this 
gap, failing to provide clear standards for patents on 
biotechnological inventions.30  Now, the Directive explicitly 
points out the need to assimilate the EC’s intellectual property 
rights regarding biotechnological inventions to TRIPS’ 
requirements.31 
Article 3 paragraph 1 of the Directive states that 
inventions “shall be patentable even if they concern a product 
consisting of or containing biological material or a process by 
means of which biological material is produced, processed or 
used.”32  According to paragraph 2, “biological material, which 
is isolated from its natural environment or produced by means 
of a technical process, may be the subject of an invention even 
if it previously occurred in nature.”33  The antagonists of 
biotechnology patents consider Art. 3 illegal, as it allows the 
granting of “patents on life.”34  This assessment violates basic 
principles of patent law. 
First, patent law does not aim at the protection of living 
organisms in situ, that is, as found in nature.  Rather, “an 
element isolated from a substance occurring in nature or 
otherwise produced” is patentable since it is “the result of 
technical processes used to identify, purify and classify it and 
 
 29. See generally S. J. R. BOSTYN, ENABLING BIOTECHNOLOGICAL 
INVENTIONS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (2001) (giving an overview of 
European and U.S. patent law). 
 30. See H.-R. JAENICHEN, THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE’S CASE LAW ON 
THE PATENTABILITY OF BIOTECHNOLOGY INVENTIONS vii (2nd ed. 1997).  See 
generally K. GOLDBACH ET AL., PROTECTION OF BIOTECHNOLOGICAL MATTER 
UNDER EUROPEAN AND GERMAN LAW (1997). 
 31. See Directive, supra note 2, recital 12, at 14, recital 36, at 16. 
 32. Id. art. 3, ¶ 1, at 18. 
 33. Id. art. 3, ¶ 2, at 18. 
 34. Den Leskien, Gentechnologie und Patentrecht [Genetic Engineering 
and Patent Law], 7 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR UMWELTRECHT 299, 301 (1996).  See 
generally Rainer Moufang, Problems Related to the Protection of New 
Technologies: Biotechnological Inventions, in EUROPEAN RESEARCH 
STRUCTURES – CHANGES AND CHALLENGES: THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 178 (Max-Planck-Gesellschaft ed., 1994); 
Baljit Dhadda, Patenting Human Genetic Information. Is Nothing Sacred?, in 
PERSPECTIVES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
ETHICS 89 (Lionel Bently & Spyros Maniatis eds., 1998). 
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reproduce it outside the human body, techniques which human 
beings alone are capable of putting into practice and which 
nature is incapable of accomplishing by itself.”35 
Second, the slogan “patents on life” creates the impression 
that patents confer property rights.  However, a patent for an 
invention does not even authorize the holder to use the 
invention; it merely entitles him to prohibit third parties from 
exploring it for industrial and commercial purposes.36  In 
addition, even if the argument that genes should not be 
“owned” because they exist in nature were well founded, it is 
really a philosophical argument that cannot easily fit into the 
grounds available for refusing a patent.37 
Third, “patents on life” have been granted for the last 160 
years.38  In Diamond, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks 
v. Chakrabarty, the U.S Supreme Court upheld a patent 
granted to Chakrabarty, a microbiologist for General Electric 
Company, for oil-eating bacteria.39  Contrary to popular belief, 
that was not the first patent to be granted for living matter.40  
Finland has been granting patent protection for living 
organisms since July 24, 1843.41  In addition, in 1873 Louis 
Pasteur was granted U.S. Patent No. 141,072, containing a 
claim to “yeast, free from organic germs of disease, as an article 
of manufacture.”42  Therefore, Art. 3 of the Directive is far less 
revolutionary than its opponents argue. 
Regarding patents on parts of the human body, Art. 5 of 
the Directive clarifies the general principles described in Art. 3.  
Article 5 paragraphs 1 and 2 repeat the differentiation between 
 
 35. Directive, supra note 2, recital 21, at 15 (concerning patents on 
substances deriving from the human body). 
 36. See id. recital 14. 
 37. See R. Stephen Crespi, Patents On Genes: Clarifying the Issues, 18 
NAT. BIOTECH. 683, 683 (2000). 
 38. See Tade Matthias Spranger, Ethical Aspects of Patenting Human 
Genotypes According to EC Biotechnology Directive, 31 INT’L REV. INDUS. 
PROP. COPYRIGHT L. 373, 376 (2000). 
 39. See Diamond, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 303 (1980); see also 1 IVER P. COOPER, 1 
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW § 2.08 (2001 Revision); I. Jane Churchill, 
Patenting Humanity: The Development of Property Rights in the Human Body 
and the Subsequent Evolution of Patentability of Living Things, 8 INTELL. 
PROP. J. 249, 270-72 (1994). 
 40. See PHILIP W. GRUBB, PATENTS FOR CHEMICALS, PHARMACEUTICALS 
AND BIOTECHNOLOGY 258 (3rd ed. 1999). 
 41. See Spranger, supra note 38, at 376. 
 42. COOPER, supra note 39, § 2.02. 
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patentable inventions and non-patentable discoveries.43  
According to these provisions, neither the “human body, at the 
various stages of its formation and development, [nor] the 
simple discovery of one of its elements, including the sequence 
or partial sequence of a gene, . . . constitute patentable 
inventions.”44  On the other hand, “an element isolated from the 
human body or otherwise produced by means of a technical 
process, including the sequence or partial sequence of a gene, 
may constitute a patentable invention, even if the structure of 
that element is identical to that of a natural element.”45 
Article 5 of the Directive raises the question of the 
patentability of ESTs, or Expressed Sequence Tags.  ESTs 
circumscribe partial sequences of a clone that is picked at 
random from a cDNA46 library and used in the identification of 
probably yet unknown genes found in a particular tissue.47  
According to some scholars’ assessments, ESTs do not 
constitute a patentable invention, but rather a mere discovery, 
since their extraction is automated.48  However, the ESTs’ 
preparation is based on a technical procedure that does not 
occur in nature and for that reason may constitute an 
invention.49 
The crucial point is that Art. 5 paragraph 3 of the Directive 
demands that the “industrial application of a sequence or a 
partial sequence of a gene must be disclosed in the patent 
application” as filed.50  Hence, the required industrial 
 
 43. See Directive, supra note 2, art. 5, ¶¶ 1-2, at 18. 
 44. Id. art. 5, ¶ 1, at 18. 
 45. Id. art. 5, ¶ 2, at 18. 
 46. cDNA stands for complementary DNA, which is synthesized from a 
messenger RNA (mRNA) template by reverse transcription.  The single-
stranded form is often used as a probe in physical mapping. 
 47. See Martin Grund & Volker Vossius, Patentability of ESTs Under the 
EPC, 2 BIO-SCIENCE L. REV. 106, 106 (1998). 
 48. See Andreas Oser, Patentierung von (Teil-) Gensequenzen unter 
besonderer Berücksichtigung der EST-Problematik [Patents on Partial Gene 
Sequences with Special Emphasis on ESTs], 47 GEWERBLICHER 
RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT INTERNATIONALER TEIL 648, 650 (1998); 
see also Christian Gugerell, The European Experience, in LE GENIE GÉNÉTIQUE 
[THE GENETIC GENIUS], BIOTECHNOLOGY AND PATENT LAW 87, 100-1 
(Francois Dessemontet ed., 1996). 
 49. See Matthias Herdegen & Tade Matthias Spranger, EC-
Law/Comment, Directive 98/44/EC, in INTERNATIONALE PRAXIS 
GENTECHNIKRECHT 1, 23 (Matthias Herdegen ed., 2001). 
 50. Directive, supra note 2, art. 5, ¶ 3, at 18. 
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application must be concrete.51  For that reason, ESTs without 
a specific function are not patentable under EC law.52  In 
addition, the concrete function requirement should also be the 
guiding principle for patents on so-called SNPs, or Single 
Nuclear Polymorphisms, which are single-base differences in a 
DNA sequence among individuals.53 
The Directive’s Art. 6 establishes different criteria for the 
patentability of inventions that refer to the human body.  
Article 6 paragraph 1 refers to ordre public and morality as 
internationally accepted limits to patentability.54  In addition, 
paragraph 2 provides a list of inventions that are excluded from 
patentability in order to provide national courts and patent 
offices with a general guide for interpreting the reference to 
ordre public and morality.55  According to this provision, 
“processes for cloning human beings,”56 “processes for modifying 
the germ line genetic identity of human beings,”57 and “uses of 
human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes”58 shall 
be considered unpatentable.  It is important to stress that these 
restrictions have no effect on the patentability of stem cell 
procedures as stem cells can neither be considered clones nor 





 51. See Herdegen & Spranger, supra note 49, at 23; see also Matthias 
Herdegen, Patenting Human Genes and Other Parts of the Human Body 
Under EC Biotechnology Directive, 3 BIO-SCIENCE L. REV. 102, 104 
(2000/2001). 
 52. See Herdegen & Spranger, supra note 49, at 23. 
 53. See id. 
 54. See Directive, supra note 2, art. 6, ¶ 1, at 18. 
 55. See id. art. 6, ¶ 2, at 18; see also Clair Baldock & Oliver Kingsbury, 
Where Did It Come from and Where Is It Going? The Biotechnology Directive 
and Its Relation to the EPC, 19 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 7, 14 (2000). 
 56. Directive, supra note 2, art. 6, ¶ 2(a), at 18.  Note that the Directive’s 
Art. 6 paragraph 2(a) discusses only the prohibition on techniques designed for 
human reproductive cloning. 
 57. Id. art. 6, ¶ 2(b), at 18. 
 58. Id. art. 6, ¶ 2(c), at 18. 
 59. See Tade Matthias Spranger, Patentability of Human Stem Cell 
Procedures in Accordance with EC Law, 11 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 
(forthcoming 2002) (manuscript at 8, on file with author).  The scope of Art. 6 
paragraph 2(c) is restricted to embryos which are capable of living in their 
natural environment, i.e., in vivo.  The Directive explicitly contemplates 
“inventions for therapeutic or diagnostic purposes which are applied to the 
human embryo and are useful to it.”  Directive, supra note 2, recital 42, at 16. 
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B. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Examining the ethical considerations of the granting of 
patents is a very difficult task.  Until now, international patent 
law was free of ethical considerations.  Although limitations for 
patentability result from ordre public and morality, these terms 
are used as strictly judicial conceptions.60  Both concepts have a 
long and distinguished history as criteria for the lawfulness of 
the grant or exercise of intellectual property rights.61  For 
example, both the TRIPS Agreement62 and the European 
Patent Convention,63 neither of which are a part of EC law but 
rather intergovernmental or international agreements, contain 
a reserve with regard to a patent’s incompatibility with ordre 
public or morality.  Nevertheless, the Directive’s provisions 
create a new level of interaction between ethics and the law. 
First, the Directive’s Art. 7 states that “the Commission’s 
European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 
evaluates all ethical aspects of biotechnology.”64  This group 
may be consulted when biotechnology (including patents on 
biotechnological inventions) are to be evaluated at the level of 
basic ethical principles.65  Notably, German and French 
scholars are demanding a strengthening of patent law’s ethical 
provisions.66  This call for additional ethical consideration 
seems to be superfluous as the Directive already contains a 
clause applying standards of ethics.  According to Recital 39, 
“ordre public and morality correspond in particular to ethical or 
moral principles recognised in a Member State.”67  Such ethical 
or moral principles shall, regardless of the technical field of the 
invention, supplement the standard legal examinations under 
 
 60. See Spranger, supra note 38, at 377-80. 
 61. See Op. Advoc. Gen., supra note 8, ¶ 38. 
 62. See TRIPS, supra note 28, art. 27, at 331. 
 63. See Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent 
Convention), Oct. 5, 1973, art. 53, § a. 
 64. Directive, supra note 2, art. 7, at 19. 
 65. See id. recital 44, at 16. 
 66. See Claus Luttermann, Patentschutz für Biotechnologie [Patent 
Protection for Biotechnology], 44 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 
916, 920 (1998); see also Andreas Fuchs, Patentrecht und Humangenetik 
[Patent Law and Human Genetics] 54 JURISTENZEITUNG 597, 598 (1999); 
DICTIONNAIRE PERMANENT BIOÉTHIQUE ET BIOTECHNOLOGIES, BULLETIN 66 
[PERMANENT DICTIONARY ON BIOETHICS AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, BULLETIN 66] 
8381, 8383 (1998). 
 67. Directive, supra note 2, recital 39, at 16. 
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patent law.68 This hidden rule leads to serious consequences, 
which have gone almost unnoticed thus far: “ethical or moral 
principles” are put in the same category as the legal terms 
ordre public and morality.  As a result, barriers between law 
and ethics are abolished.  Recital 39 is more than a mere 
stylistic inaccuracy.  Rather, the provision explicitly demands 
an ethical supplement to the standard legal examinations 
under patent law. 
This regulation, notwithstanding the question of its 
compatibility with WTO law, blurs the barriers between law 
and ethics and is detrimental to patent law in that the 
influence of ethics often results in decisions in which the ethical 
perspective is not clearly distinguished from the legal 
assessment.69  In contrast to ethics’ objective of philosophical 
reflection, the law’s intention is a practical one.  The law does 
not “proclaim values that it cannot, within reason, also put into 
practice.”70  Even if the rule of law rests on moral principles,71 
law has to be readily ascertainable, distinct, and firm.  Ethics, 
in contrast, does not meet these requirements. 
 
C. FARMER’S PRIVILEGE 
 
Another important question concerns the so-called farmer’s 
privilege.72  Article 11 of the Directive states: 
the sale or other form of commercialization of plant propagating 
material to a farmer by the holder of the patent or with his consent 
for agricultural use, implies authorization for the farmer to use the 
product of his harvest for propagation or multiplication by him on 
his own farm, the extent and conditions of this derogation 
corresponding to those under Article 14 of Regulation (EC) No. 
2100/94.73 
 
 68. See id. 
 69. See Paolo Zatti, Towards a Law for Bioethics, in A LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
FOR BIOETHICS 53, 59 (Cosimo Marco Mazzoni ed., 1998). 
 70. Id. at 60. 
 71. See Zeynep Davran, The Ethical Foundations of the Rule of Law, in 
ETHICS OF THE PROFESSIONS: MEDICINE, BUSINESS, MEDIA, LAW 117 (Ioanna 
Kuçuradi ed., 1999). 
 72. See Herdegen & Spranger, supra note 49, at 32-33.  See generally Tade 
Matthias Spranger, Landwirteprivileg bei Patentierung biotechnologischer 
Erfindungen nach der EG-Biotechnologierichtlinie [Farmers Privilege and 
Patents on Biotechnological Inventions Under EC Biotechnology Directive] 29 
AGRARRECHT 240 (1999). 
 73. Directive, supra note 2, art. 11, ¶ 1, at 19. 
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Article 11 paragraph 2 extends the privilege to animal 
reproductive material, stating: 
the sale or any other form of commercialization of breeding stock or 
other animal reproductive material to a farmer by the holder of the 
patent or with his consent implies authorization for the farmer to 
use the protected livestock for an agricultural purpose. This 
includes making the animal or other animal reproductive material 
available for the purposes of pursuing his agricultural activity but 
not the sale within the framework or for the purpose of a 
commercial reproduction activity.74 
Article 11 turns out to be problematic for two reasons.  
First, paragraph 2 of Art. 11 corresponds with Art. 34 of  
TRIPS, which states: 
For the purposes of civil proceedings in respect of the infringement 
of the rights of the owner referred to in paragraph 1(b) of Article 
28, if the subject matter of a patent is a process for obtaining a 
product, the judicial authorities shall have the authority to order 
the defendant to prove that the process to obtain an identical 
product is different from the patented process. Therefore, Members 
shall provide, in at least one of the following circumstances, that 
any identical product when produced without the consent of the 
patent owner shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be 
deemed to have been obtained by the patented process: 
(a) if the product obtained by the patented process is new; 
(b) if there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product 
was made by the process and the owner of the patent has been 
unable through reasonable efforts to determine the process 
actually used.75 
As a result, TRIPS Art. 34 imposes a reversal of the burden 
of proof to the detriment of the farmer.  The farmer has to 
prove that he did not violate the rights of the holder of the 
patent.  Is this the correct approach?  Taking into account the 
possibility of self-sowing, the farmer’s difficulty in proving his 
innocence is obvious.  Although the Directive is indispensable 
for the justified protection of entrepreneurial interests, the 
reference to TRIPS Art. 34 turns out to be misguided. 
The second problem refers to the extension of the farmer’s 
privilege with regard to animals.  Since the “sale within the 
framework or for the purpose of a commercial reproduction 
 
 74. Id. art. 11, ¶ 2, at 19. 
 75. TRIPS, supra note 28, art. 34, at 334. 
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activity”76 is excluded from the farmer’s privilege, it is difficult 
to draw a bright line.  What happens if the farmer has to sell a 
part of his livestock due to financial problems?  Is this a sale 
within the framework or for the purpose of a commercial 
reproduction activity?  In this regard, the wording of the 
Directive is absolutely insufficient. 
 
D. COMPULSORY CROSS-LICENSING 
 
In order to avoid a conflict between the holders of plant 
variety rights and patents, the Directive provides for 
compulsory cross-licensing of patent and plant variety rights.77  
Article 12 paragraph 1 states, 
where a breeder cannot acquire or exploit a plant variety right 
without  infringing a prior patent, he may apply for a compulsory 
licence for non-exclusive use of the invention protected by the 
patent inasmuch as the licence is necessary for the exploitation of 
the plant variety to be protected, subject to payment of an 
appropriate royalty.78 
Where such a license is granted, “Member States shall provide 
that . . . the holder of the patent will be entitled to a cross-
licence on reasonable terms to use the protected variety.”79  
Conversely, Art. 12 paragraph 2 ensures that the holder of a 
patent may apply for a compulsory license for use of a protected 
plant variety, and the holder of the variety right will be entitled 
to a cross-license.80  By this, the Directive acknowledges the fact 
that guaranteed access must be granted where the invention 
represents significant technical progress of considerable 
economic interest.81 
The conditions for cross-licenses mandated by Art. 12 
paragraph 3 have been the object of much criticism.  To comply 
with this provision, applicants for cross-licenses must 
demonstrate that “they have applied unsuccessfully to the 
holder of the patent or of the plant variety right to obtain a 
contractual licence”82 and that “the plant variety or the 
 
 76. Directive, supra note 2, art. 11, ¶ 2, at 19. 
 77. See Baldock & Kingsbury, supra note 55, at 16. 
 78. Directive, supra note 2, art. 12, ¶ 1, at 19. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See id. art. 12, ¶ 2, at 19. 
 81. See id. recital 53, at 17. 
 82. Id. art. 12, ¶ 3(a), at 20. 
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invention constitutes significant technical progress of 
considerable economic interest compared with the invention 
claimed in the patent or the protected plant variety.”83  
According to some scholars’ assessments, the absence of a 
definition of what “unsuccessfully” means violates the general 
principle of legal clarity:84  does unsuccessfully mean that the 
applicant has been refused a license altogether or that the two 
parties simply could not agree on the contractual terms?85  
Arguably, the meaning of “unsuccessfully” cannot be generally 
defined, since its application is inevitably case specific.  
However, the assertion that the meaning of “unsuccessfully” is 
undetermined is not convincing, as TRIPS Art. 31(b) has 
already established an applicable definition.  TRIPS Art. 31(b) 
concerns the use a patent without the authorization of the 
patent holder.86  It states that 
such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed 
user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder 
on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such 
efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period of 
time.87 
Although TRIPS Art. 31(b) does not explicitly define 
“unsuccessful,” it makes it clear that unsuccessful efforts are a 
central tenant of international patent law. 
Article 12 paragraph 3(b) is also unclear as to what 
constitutes a significant technical progress of “considerable 
economic interest.” Obviously, an individual’s interest cannot 
constitute a considerable economic interest within the meaning 
of Art. 12.  Requiring such a determination would thwart the 
purpose of patent law.  Most scholars assume that it is the 
public’s economic interest, rather than that of an individual 
person or company, that would have to be evaluated.88  
However, the so-called “public’s economic interest” renders it 
even more difficult to implement Art. 12 paragraph 3(b):  public 
interests are too varied and divergent to provide a legal 
 
 83. Id. art. 12, ¶ 3(b), at 20. 
 84. See generally Matthias Herdegen, The Origins and Development of the 
General Principles of Community Law, in GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY LAW 1 (U. Bernitz & J. Nergelius eds., 2000). 
 85. See J. Ardley, Compulsory Cross-Licensing: An Examination of Article 
12 of the Biotechnology Directive, 2 BIO-SCIENCE L. REV. 135, 36 (1998/1999); 
see also Baldock & Kingsbury, supra note 55, at 16. 
 86. See TRIPS, supra note 28, art. 31(b), at 333. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See Ardley, supra note 85, at 136. 
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standard in any particular case.  Instead, the “considerable 
economic interest” for the purposes of Art. 12 paragraph 3(b) 
should be assumed if the compulsory license would have a 




The legal framework of the “Directive 98/44/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the 
legal protection of biotechnological inventions” seems to be 
defective and full of loopholes.  In particular, it fails to expel 
ethical considerations from patent law. Nevertheless, it 
presents an important step toward the improvement of the 
patentability of biotechnological inventions in Europe, as it 
recognizes the need for an adequate protection of intellectual 
property.  In view of the Directive’s implementation, the 




 89. See RICHARD FLAMMER, BIOTECHNOLOGISCHE ERFINDUNGEN IM 
PATENTRECHT [BIOTECHNOLOGICAL INVENTIONS IN THE FIELD OF PATENT 
LAW] 173 (1999). 

